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Abstract  
In this paper, we identify the ways in which the existing literature has examined financial 
technology (FinTech). Using the frame of the ‘FinTech Cube’, we examine how FinTech 
unfolds through the intersections of key actors, technologies and institutions. We demonstrate 
the relevance of FinTech for two areas of geographical enquiry: i) the reshaping of global 
production and financial networks, and ii) financial inclusion and poverty reduction in poorer 
countries. In doing so, we accord particular attention to the significance of FinTech for 
theoretical and empirical research in economic geography. 
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Towards an economic geography of FinTech 
 
I. Introduction 
The geographies of finance have been the subject of considerable attention since the 1990s, 
yet what is now called ‘FinTech’ (a short-hand for ‘financial technology’) is only beginning 
to attract critical social scientific scrutiny. While this may owe to the newness of FinTech, 
with the term in use only since 2014 by global consultancy firms in industry reports, the 
limited critical scholarly attention also stems from the unwieldy and confusing nature of 
FinTech insofar as it encompasses a vast array of financial and technological innovations. In 
fact, FinTech seems to have acquired the characteristics of a ‘chaotic concept’ (Sayer, 1984), 
or a ‘portmanteau’ (Shim and Shin, 2016). FinTech operates at the intersections of the 
finance and technology sectors where technology-focused start-ups and new market entrants 
are creating new platforms, products, and services beyond those currently provided by the 
traditional finance industry. These FinTech entities are changing how businesses and 
consumers make payments, lend, borrow, and invest, and are heralded as being particularly 
innovative and disruptive to existing financial practices and industry dynamics.  
 FinTech is significant for at least four reasons. First, it grew very rapidly during the 
2010s; between 2010 and 2018, global venture capital investment in FinTech increased from 
about US$1.8 billion to US$56 billion (Accenture, 2019).1 Second, FinTech is being actively 
promoted by governments and private actors in major international financial centers (IFCs) as 
an opportunity for capturing new markets and developing new capabilities that would bolster 
their IFC status. Third, FinTech appears to ‘disrupt’ (or at least reconfigure) existing financial 
institutions and market segments through promises of lower costs, higher efficiency, greater 
convenience, and product customization that better suit customer profiles and needs. Fourth, 
FinTech has significant implications for reshaping inter alia global production and financial 
networks, and ‘development’ in poorer countries.   
In light of FinTech’s polymorphic qualities and its potential for economic and social 
change, we present the idea of a ‘FinTech Cube’ for conceptualizing the intersections of key 
actors, technologies, and institutions. We then review the emerging academic literature on 
FinTech, and highlight two research themes for geographical enquiry: i) the reshaping of 
global production and financial networks, and ii) the implications of FinTech for ‘financial 
                                                 
1 The calculation of this figure is admittedly murky since the scope of FinTech is never defined. Other reports 
provide substantially different figures (see e.g. KPMG, 2019).  
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inclusion’ and ‘development’ in the global south. In doing so, we accord particular attention 
to the significance of FinTech for theoretical and empirical research in economic geography.  
  
II.  Making sense of FinTech 
While money and finance have always involved technology, no financial innovation has thus 
far involved the combination of digital re-intermediation, artificial intelligence (AI), 
blockchains, and mobile technologies. Although FinTech is often associated with ‘financial 
disintermediation’, as financial services are being offered by other entities without the need 
for banks, or even physical commodities (such as cash or cheques), ‘re-intermediation’ might 
be more appropriate as the relationships between finance and technology firms are constantly 
evolving (French and Leyshon, 2004). Arner et al. (2015) trace the origins of the term 
‘FinTech’ to the early 1990s and the Citigroup-initiated ‘Financial Services Technology 
Consortium’, even though the term did not gain traction until the 2010s. They define FinTech 
simply as “…the use of technology to deliver financial solutions” (p. 3). Schueffel (2016) 
views FinTech “…as a new financial industry that applies technology to improve financial 
activities” (p. 45). ‘To deliver’ and ‘to improve’ may have very different connotations, 
depending on whether one interprets ‘to improve’ as normative or focused on firms’ search 
for greater productivity, cost savings, or new markets. The FSB (2017) describes FinTech as 
“technologically enabled financial innovation [that] is giving rise to new business models, 
applications, processes and products” (p. 7).  The vagueness of these definitions reflects the 
difficulties of delineating exactly where FinTech might begin and end. Many FinTech 
products and services are being offered by technology companies (ranging from start-ups to 
large multinational corporations) but banks are also important investors in FinTech systems 
and applications. The participation of large numbers of investors in crowdfunding and the use 
of social media are prominent in some FinTech segments but not important elsewhere 
(Langley and Leyshon, 2017a). Definitions of FinTech therefore depend on particular 
industry segments, participants, and analytical concerns of specific studies.  
Instead of generating a list or table of different categories or applications of FinTech, 
we prefer the idea of a ‘FinTech Cube’, which comprises i) financial products and services, 
ii) technologies, and iii) key actors that intersect in various ways to provide technologically 
mediated or enabled financial solutions (Figure 1). The multiple axes offer broad coverage 
and flexibility in capturing the principal dimensions of FinTech. Each area inside the cube 
can be examined in relation to the three dimensions and their properties. While FinTech 
could be analyzed from the perspective of a financial product, some FinTech applications 
  4 
might involve multiple technologies and actors. For instance, financing could be offered by 
both banks and technology companies involving blockchains, ‘big data’ analytics and P2P 
technology through crowdfunding. For investments, assets could be managed through 
algorithm-based and automated advice (‘robo-advising’) using AI and ‘big data’. In terms of 
key actors, technology firms, banks, and non-bank financial institutions (e.g. insurance 
companies) are prominent but regulators and central banks are increasingly important in 
reshaping the regulatory and policy landscapes of FinTech, by using such technologies to 
improve regulatory processes (e.g. RegTech) and even the potential issuance of central bank 
cryptocurrencies (Bech and Garratt, 2017). Over time, new technologies, financial products 
and services, and other institutions may enter the FinTech space to create new ‘segments’ in 
the Cube, as indicated by the dotted arrows of the three axes. The ways in which new 
segments appear and how they intersect have important implications for how we analyze and 
consider key research themes in economic geography, which we will discuss in greater detail 
later in this paper. For the moment, we turn to examine the ways in which it has been 
conceptualized in the scholarly literature. 
 
*** Figure 1 around here ***   
 
III. Emerging academic literature on FinTech 
Our review of FinTech studies has identified four main perspectives (some of these will be 
discussed further in our thematic sections). The first seeks to explain the longue durée growth 
and emergence of Fintech. Arner et al. (2015) trace its beginnings to the 19th century and 
label the period of FinTech since 2008 as ‘FinTech 3.0’. In this latter period, financial 
products and services are distinguishable from previous eras by their providers—who are 
increasingly not traditional banking and financial institutions. Some of the explanations for 
this growth include changing public perceptions of banking and finance, technological 
innovation, the lay-off of financial workers and their re-allocation to start-ups, more 
challenging regulation for conventional banks, inadequate bank finance, and distrust of state-
supported ‘too-big-to-fail banks’ after the 2008 global financial crisis. Indeed, Bitcoin and 
other cryptocurrencies have strong roots in an anti-statist techno-libertarianism (e.g. Zook 
and Blankenship, 2018).  
Yet, these reasons (and their temporal framing) may be ‘global-north-centric’ since 
mobile financial services (MFS) such as the ubiquitous M-PESA in Kenya grew partly out of 
quite different rationale, namely addressing poverty and financial exclusion in poorer 
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countries (Maurer, 2012; Gabor and Brooks, 2017). As in the FinTech cube, this rationale has 
brought together firms, institutions, and customers in the creation of Fintech products 
(Maurer, 2012). From the perspective of consumers specifically in Africa, Johnson (2016) 
argues (albeit with some contentions) that most Kenyans perceive the industry dominant 
Safaricom and the internationally funded MPESA (operated by the former) to be more stable 
and ‘neutral’ than conventional banks in a time of political volatility, and therefore less likely 
to collapse. For China, Shim and Shin (2016) conceptualize the growth of FinTech using 
actor-network theory and Callon’s concept of ‘translation’. Their analysis of how on-line 
payment systems have emerged in China relies on understanding how a network is 
established through problematization, interessement, enrollment, and mobilization. Chen 
(2016) refers to the growth of FinTech in poorer countries as the consequence of ‘last-mover 
advantage’. In other words, poorer countries are a financial tabula rasa (institutionally and 
digitally-speaking), in which the comparative paucity of existing banks and financial 
institutions (especially in rural areas), combined with rapid economic development and 
growing middle class, such as in China, India, and sub-Saharan Africa, have led to a more 
rapid adoption of MFS than in many richer countries. 
 A second perspective centers on firm strategies and inter-firm relationships of 
FinTech (e.g. Hendrikse et al., 2018; Shim and Shin, 2016; Zalan and Toufaily, 2017). 
Studies examine the intersections of market participants, FinTech infrastructure and financial 
ecologies or eco-systems through changing power dynamics between large financial 
institutions (‘incumbents’) and Fin-Tech start-ups (‘disruptors’) (Lai, forthcoming). For 
example, Hendrikse et al. (2018) examine inter-firm relationships to evaluate the common 
notion that FinTech ‘start-ups’ threaten traditional ‘incumbent financial institutions’. They 
argue that FinTech firms are following Apple’s business model with the embrace, capture, 
and internalization of disruptive FinTech companies as start-ups could compete ‘freely’ while 
being locked into a particular platform for distribution and customer access. Large 
technology firms thus use their competitive advantages in data and algorithms to accrue and 
analyze user data in order to extract value (Langley and Leyshon, 2017b). At the same time, 
financial incumbents are themselves embracing technological change. However, Zalan and 
Toufaily (2017) note that in the Gulf Cooperation Countries (aside from Bahrain and UAE) 
and North Africa, incumbents do not seem to be so easily threatened by FinTech start-ups 
because of an ill-equipped regulatory landscape for innovative start-ups.  
A third literature focuses on blockchain technology. This is at the moment mainly a 
speculative literature (and usually of a technical or applied nature) that began in the 2010s 
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and mostly focuses on the ‘global north’. A full review of the literature is beyond the scope 
of this paper (see, for example, Casino et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019; Zook and 
Blankenship, 2019). However, there are some pertinent insights for global production and 
development issues. According to Wang et al. (2019) blockchain technology is likely to 
shape future supply chain practices due to four key advantages: extended visibility and 
traceability, digitization and disintermediation, improved data security and smart contracts. 
Though they recognize that blockchain technology creates challenges such as issues of 
governance, ethics, corporate power, intellectual piracy, automation-induced unemployment, 
and technical vulnerability issues. For poorer countries, Kshetri (2017) argues that 
blockchains could increase efficiency and reduce transaction costs, which in turn could lead 
to improvements in the costs and bureaucratic complexity of property registration, reduction 
of fraud and corruption, empowerment of donors in ensuring that funds are channeled to 
intended programs and recipients, and improving trade and business financing. However, 
various challenges remain, such as lagging infrastructure, high energy consumption, 
regulatory uncertainties, and lack of standardization.  
A fourth perspective on FinTech provides a relatively more sanguine discussion of 
regulation and market-making support, while recognizing the regulatory challenge of 
balancing innovation with risk (Arner et al., 2015; Maurer, 2012; Shim and Shin, 2016; Tsai 
and Peng, 2017). Financial regulators are concerned with a number of different objectives, 
such as ensuring financial stability, prudential regulation, conduct and fairness, and 
competition and market development (Tsai and Peng, 2017: 111). Regarding China, Shim 
and Shin (2016) point to two different regulatory or market-making strategies since 2008: 
techno-globalism and pragmatic techno-nationalism. They contend that the growth of 
FinTech is strongly tied to Chinese government policies, in which the Chinese government 
uses a techno-globalist strategy to improve competitiveness of FinTech firms, while using a 
techno-nationalist strategy to create ‘national champions’ and shield domestically-owned 
firms from foreign companies (see also Wójcik and Camilleri, 2015). Despite the significance 
of (national forms of) territoriality and regulation, FinTech in the 21st century may not be 
controlled by national regulators in a world of international non-bank providers (Arner et al., 
2015).    
In sum, while some economic geographers have started to research various aspects of 
FinTech (e.g. Haberley et al., 2019; Hendriske et al., 2018; Langley and Leyshon, 2017a), 
most of the other social science research lacks spatial, and often critical and theoretical, 
perspectives in unpacking the evolving relationships and uneven spatial impacts. In the next 
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sections, we address this deficiency by exploring two themes common to the study of 
economic geography.  
 
IV. Economic geographies of FinTech: two themes 
Given the significance of FinTech as discussed above, we argue that economic geographers 
should consider how the intersections of financial products and services, technologies, and 
institutions (Figure 1) are reshaping economic activities and their uneven outcomes. To 
illustrate these transformations, we focus on two areas: global production and financial 
networks, and ‘financial inclusion’ and poverty reduction.   
 
Reconfiguring global production and financial networks  
FinTech is creating new growth opportunities for both technology firms and financial 
institutions, although there is also uncertainty about whether future production and financial 
networks would be characterized by ruptures (due to displacement or obsolescence) or 
redistribution (as existing players grow and enrich the market or acquire new FinTech firms 
and technologies). The development of FinTech has important implications into how the 
territorial and relational dimension of global production networks (GPNs) and global 
financial networks (GFNs) might change, and their impacts on local and regional 
development.  
In terms of production networks, we identify emerging developments relating to 
financing, new actors in financial intermediation, and changes in lead firm-supplier 
relationships. FinTech is changing the traditional reliance of firms on bank financing, debt 
issuance and capital markets for financing needs. This is especially pertinent for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are accessing alternative financing via online 
platforms, and as production companies themselves engage in financial intermediation. Tsai 
and Peng (2017), for example, identify new models of online ‘supply-chain financing’ with e-
commerce platforms (e.g. Alibaba) providing loans online, while some commercial banks are 
also collaborating with e-commerce platforms to offer bank-based funding and financial 
services. These new forms of supply chain financing enable more favorable lending terms to 
SMEs, which were previously unbanked or had to accept financing on less favorable terms 
compared to larger firms. Owing to factors such as low transaction volumes, limited 
collateral and short operating history, SMEs often do not meet the credit criteria according to 
banks’ internal procedures. E-commerce platforms, on the other hand, have proprietary 
information on transactional data, such as volume, service reliability, product quality, reviews 
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of users/buyers, that could be used in place of (or in conjunction with) limited credit data to 
evaluate these firms (Aitken, 2017). This is significant as better access to financing could 
reshape firms’ attitudes towards risks associated with co-development of products and 
technologies with other firms, and their modes of strategic coupling with particular firms and 
localities (Yeung, 2016).   
The boundary between ‘production’ and ‘finance’ is increasingly blurred with the 
entrance of new technology firms or financial divisions of manufacturing companies into 
financial services. Foxconn, the world’s largest contract manufacturer of consumer 
electronics, is reshaping inter-firm networks and power relations via its e-commerce 
platform, which is also being used for providing loans and financial guarantees (Tsai and 
Peng, 2017). By leveraging on its business relationships and close knowledge of suppliers’ 
business operations and financial status, Foxconn is able to lower credit risks as firms already 
have to meet strict criteria to become its qualified suppliers. Foxconn’s business model of 
online supply-chain financing raises the issue of financial re-intermediation or shadow 
banking as it increasingly acts as a non-bank credit intermediary. The integration of supply 
chain financing and B2B transactions via e-commerce platform is also increasing the power 
of Foxconn in shaping supplier networks. FinTech is therefore reshaping bargaining power 
and strategic coupling between firms. Rather than focusing on how firms create or enhance 
value through improving manufacturing processes, labor efficiencies, acquiring new 
technologies or generate cost savings through changing supplier networks (Coe and Yeung, 
2015), firms are developing new forms of competitive advantage, for example, in financing 
or data intelligence. Online transactions are producing massive amounts of data for 
algorithmic analysis, which are being mobilized by technology firms or divisions to generate 
fine-grained information for new products and market segments (Gabor and Brooks, 2017; 
Langevin, 2019). As seen in the Foxconn example, firms are becoming financial actors as 
well as ‘productive’ ones through the development of new FinTech solutions. We could 
therefore see the insertion of new actors in the FinTech Cube (Figure 1), such as 
manufacturing firms, in providing financing, payments or credit solutions through data 
analytics. This goes beyond the pursuit of new forms of revenue through providing additional 
services, but has the effect of ‘locking-in’ users by providing a growing ecosystem of 
business and financial services for Foxconn’s suppliers, which in turn bolsters the network 
power and market position of Foxconn. FinTech thus presents new opportunities for 
reconceptualizing new modes of value creation, value enhancement and firm upgrading in 
GPN analysis.   
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Other than reworking the boundary between finance and production, Fintech entities 
are also shifting industry boundaries. The ways in which technology firms are moving into 
other sectors through advantages in data analytics, AI and platform technologies are 
reshaping their ‘lead firm’ positions in GPNs. For instance, China’s second largest e-
commerce firm, JD.com (whose parent company is FinTech conglomerate Tencent) provides 
Internet-based financial products and services via its e-commerce platform that includes 
online payments, supply chain financing, P2P lending and crowdfunding. Based on its 
success with online payments, data analytics, and heavy investments in AI and robotics for 
logistics operations, JD has ventured into the offline retail space by opening supermarkets 
(7fresh). Customers in stores use smart shopping carts that collect data for analyzing 
movement and buying preferences and cashless payments are made via JD accounts (Tang, 
2018). This follows a similar strategy by Alibaba and its Hema supermarkets, where 
payments are handled through the already popular Alipay (owned by Alibaba’s Ant 
Financial), and data collected from transactions within the store and across Alibaba’s other 
consumer platforms is used to personalize recommendations (Chou 2018). Through data and 
technological assets, these FinTech firms are influencing consumer preferences and behavior, 
and carving out new positions within and across industry sectors.  
While the above examples of FinTech developments come from both technology and 
manufacturing firms, they have a common strategy of mobilizing key advantages in digital 
intermediation and platform organization. A ‘lead firm’ then could position itself as a 
platform-based intermediary, with competitive advantages and assets in data and algorithms 
rather than as an owner of capital or employer of labor. This becomes more obvious if we 
focus on the leading FinTech giants commonly referred to as GAFA (Google, Apple, 
Facebook and Amazon) and BAT (Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent). These BigTech firms act as 
platforms, a distinctive mode of capitalist enterprise that use digital infrastructures to accrue 
and analyze user data in order to extract value from intermediation (Srnicek, 2016; Langley 
and Leyshon, 2017b). Financial reintermediation from these firms involves not just the 
reduction of transaction costs but also the monetization of transaction data itself that could be 
used by the firm (or sold to others) for purposes such as supply chain management, market 
segmentation and credit risk analysis. If the ‘platform’ is becoming an increasingly important 
business model, we need to consider its impacts on firm and consumer behavior, labor 
markets, the organization of global production, and the winners and losers of such a process. 
Contrary to expectations of the ‘disruptive’ potential of FinTech startups for financial 
services, a more likely scenario is that of growth and consolidation as successful platform 
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businesses grow ever larger and monopolize new market structures of finance and production 
through capturing the ever-expanding value created by user activities and interactions across 
their platforms (Haberly et al., 2019). For leading technology firms such as GAFA and BAT, 
their ever-growing size, user-capture, and data expertise are positioning them as central 
actors in mainstream corporate landscapes rather than niche players in technology, finance, or 
retail. This generates different modes of cultivating and capturing ‘value’ compared to 
current GPN analysis. As more actors, technologies and financial services are involved in 
FinTech, there is a need to address the new spatialities that create and are created by the 
reconfiguration of business orientation, labor markets and broader production networks. 
In the remaining section on GFNs, we point to two main issues: the increasing 
importance of technology firms and clusters, and the role of regulatory actors. The 
conceptualization of GFNs needs rethinking in terms of who counts as significant financial 
actors and whether new spatialities of finance are emerging from the growth of FinTech. 
While Coe et al. (2014) identify finance and advanced business service firms (e.g. law and 
accounting firms) as vital actors in GFNs, technology firms are playing increasingly 
important roles in these interlocking FinTech ecologies (Lai, forthcoming). In addition to 
IFCs and offshore jurisdictions, we need to reconsider the role of technology clusters in the 
reconfiguration of financial centers and networks. Research by Haberly et al. (2019), for 
instance, demonstrates how data centers, high-tech clusters and back office operations are 
now integral components of GFNs for conceptualizing the organizational and geographic 
logic of the digital platform economy in finance. By examining the locational decisions of 
FinTech firms, how they intersect with knowledge networks in IFCs and innovative clusters, 
and the types of capital, regulatory and organizational structures required, we can improve 
contemporary understanding of how new FinTech processes and relationships are shaping 
local and regional development. While financial geography and urban studies literatures have 
rich accounts of financial center development and their roles in wider economic networks 
(Cassis and Wojcik, 2018; Taylor and Derudder, 2015), research on FinTech could reshape 
some of those conceptualizations. Research on high-tech development and learning regions 
have also largely treated technology clusters as a separate analytical category rather than 
consider their intersections with finance (Cooke and de Laurentis, 2010; Shearmur et al. 
2016). Even as FinTech innovations are emerging from technology firms, banks and financial 
institutions are also creating technological incubators and accelerator programs; these 
developments have spatial implications for financial innovation as FinTech could reshape the 
growth trajectories of IFCs and high-tech clusters. For instance, FinTech could present new 
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opportunities for smaller financial centers to develop specific expertise or increase their 
significance within GFNs. San Francisco, Boston and Stockholm are relatively small 
financial centers in terms of conventional capital markets, financial services and commercial 
activities, but they could carve out new roles as FinTech centers due to their established high-
tech economies and start-up culture, strong venture capital markets and financial actors who 
are familiar with the opportunities and limitations of conventional finance industry offerings 
amidst technological change. There is growing industry interest around a Nordic FinTech 
cluster led by innovation ‘hotspots’ in Sweden, Denmark and Finland for similar reasons 
(Turula, 2016). These developments could stimulate new debates in evolutionary economic 
geography (Boschma and Frenken, 2011; Hassink et al. 2014).   
State-sponsored investments (often as joint development with private sectors) in 
technology clusters and incubators might have more significant impact on financial products 
and services than currently acknowledged in the academic literature. Given that the role of 
the state has been relatively underappreciated in the conceptualization of GFNs (for some 
exceptions, see Wojcik and Camilleri, 2015; Lai, 2018b), this calls for greater consideration 
of state actors and regulators in not only enabling FinTech growth through regulatory 
adjustments and risk management but also strengthening IFC competitiveness in 
entrepreneurial ways. FinTech is being actively promoted in a number of leading IFCs, such 
as London, New York, Luxembourg, Singapore, and Hong Kong, as vital for capturing new 
markets and developing new capabilities that would build upon and bolster their IFC 
prominence. State initiatives include creating FinTech divisions and leadership in their 
respective regulatory bodies, setting up special ‘sandbox’ environments to enable pilot trials, 
attracting inward FDI and overseas investments in FinTech firms, and signing Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) with other countries to facilitate knowledge exchange and 
collaboration in FinTech activities (Lai, 2018a). Hendrikse et al. (2019), for instance, 
highlight the challenges posed by FinTech to establish IFCs in the age of digital finance. 
Their detailed study of Brussels points to the emergence of a ‘Fin-Tech-State triangle’ with 
the strategic coupling of big financial institutions with small tech startups through specific 
actions of Belgian entrepreneurs and state actors. While this creates new opportunities for 
second-tier financial centers like Brussels, it also has the tendency to favor incumbent 
financial actors in colonizing the emerging FinTech space. Haberly et al. (2019) also shows 
how digital asset management platforms (comprising index funds and exchange-traded funds, 
robo-advising, and analytics services) are developed through in-house innovations by major 
financial firms rather than from external technology companies, which has reinforced the 
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position of incumbent banks and fund managers. This has also bolstered the power of New 
York as a leading asset management center instead of San Francisco, despite its key role in 
spearheading robo-advising, as pioneering startups are increasingly out-competed or 
purchased by established financial giants.   
Our final point concerns regulation and GFNs. Conventional financial services are 
organized through centralized infrastructures and national governance systems, while 
FinTech operates through a more distributed decentralized governance structure with 
information flowing more directly between producers and consumers of finance (Knight and 
Wójcik, 2017). This creates new regulatory challenges in the technical (scalability, IT 
security) and non-technical (legal, tax treatment) domains that are difficult to tackle and 
resolve within existing centralized regulatory frameworks (Gomber et al., 2018), not least 
because the data-centric domains of the leading FinTech conglomerates lie outside current 
banking and finance regulation. The actions and attitudes of regulators is vital in shaping 
business and financial practices as well as impact on the trajectories of financial centers. New 
regulation such as Revised Payment Service Directive (PSD2) in Europe is expected to 
provide reintermediation opportunities for FinTech firms (Capgemini, 2017). Such regulatory 
changes are particularly important in the face of decline in traditional banking activities and 
increase in shadow banking, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis with increasing 
regulatory burden, heightened legal scrutiny and larger capital requirements (Buchak et al., 
2017). While FinTech could replace existing financial markets and banking institutions with 
new platformed arrangements (World Economic Forum, 2017), it could also reinforce the 
incumbent positions of large financial institutions who are able to absorb startups and new 
technologies with deeper pockets, and have large customer base, existing regulatory 
relationships and stronger branding (Hendrikse et al., 2019). These scenarios would present 
different regulatory challenges. The prioritization of market expansion in order to generate 
and capture value from digital intermediation points to the likelihood of consolidation that 
favor large technology firms or incumbent banks, with monopolistic and oligopolistic 
tendencies. This should caution against the problematic assumption that FinTech would 
enhance competition and provide greater choice and efficiencies. Instead more attention 
should be directed at scrutinizing the role of BigTech and BigBanks in the evolving FinTech 
Cube. There are signs of growing unease about the power of BigTech platforms, such as the 
controversy around Facebook’s plan to launch its cryptocurrency ‘Libra’ and the role of 
Sesame Credit (part of the Alibaba conglomerate) in China’s emerging social credit system, 
which point to increased scrutiny as they enter the regulatory space for new financial 
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products and services. The economic power of US-based conglomerates like GAFA vis-à-vis 
the globalizing Chinese BAT technology firms could also present future challenges if these 
BigTech firms become caught up in various sanctions and regulatory restrictions resulting 
from US and China trade wars or other political disputes, which is already evident in the case 
of Google in China and Huawei in the US. The growing significance of FinTech should 
prompt renewed research interest into the political economy of money and finance, 
specifically the geographical and structural shifts in power between states, between states and 
markets, and between groups of social and economic actors; this was prominent in early 
financial geography research in the 1990s (Leyshon, 1995) but faded in comparison to a 
cultural economy approach (Hall, 2011), and resurfaced more recently following the 2008 
financial crisis (Christophers et al., 2017).  
While GPN and financial geography literatures have provided rich analyses and 
explanations of firms’ geographical strategies, state-firm relationships, strategic nodes and 
networks, and financial center development, these processes and outcomes are experiencing 
substantive changes with FinTech. With the blurring of boundaries between financial and 
non-financial firms and activities, FinTech should prompt geographers to re-examine the 
relationships between finance and production, inter-firm relationships, new modes of value 
capture and creation, and the spatial impacts of reconfigured production networks.  
 
FinTech and ‘development’ in poorer countries: last-mover advantage? 
In this section, we examine the three axes in Figure 1 with respect to mobile financial 
services (MFS), which are a chief element of FinTech in poorer countries. MFS include 
micro-payments, electronic money, and mobile banking channels (Duncombe and Boateng, 
2009). We focus on two dimensions: the extent to which MFS lead to greater ‘financial 
inclusion’ and poverty reduction; and the ways in which MFS in poorer countries are 
produced through ‘northern’ corporations, businesses, policies and practices, often in 
conjunction with ‘southern’ businesses, entrepreneurs, and political elites. Our aim is to offer 
some empirical suggestions for how we might build an economic geography of MFS, and to 
outline some theoretical implications of MFS for debates in economic geography. While 
much of our discussion pertains  to ‘developmental’ issues in in the ‘global south’, they are 
by no means absent in the ‘global north’, and we reject such a rigid binary while pointing to 
the complex flows and relationships that connect them.    
Many scholars argue that MFS “help improve financial access and universal 
inclusion” in poorer regions of the world (Tsai and Peng, 2017: 2; see also Donner and Telez, 
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2008; Jack and Suri, 2014, 2016; Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2017); lead to inclusive growth (e.g. 
Alampay et al., 2017), or  “…unlock significant economic opportunity and accelerate social 
development” (Ding et al., 2018: 20).  Similarly, Manacorda and Tesei (2016) refer to mobile 
phones as ‘liberation technologies’ and ‘mobile money’ has been labelled a ‘revolution’ 
(Burns, 2018; Jack and Suri, 2014) – what Maurer (2012) calls an ‘empowerment narrative’. 
According to the World Bank (2017), greater access to ‘digital financial services’ can 
increase ‘income earning potential’ and contribute to poverty reduction by allowing people to 
manage financial risk, receive payments at lower cost, increase savings and reduce 
government corruption. Likewise, Alampay et al. (2017) argue that MFS facilitates access to 
lower-cost credit, which could reduce income inequality and facilitate economic activity.  
By some definitions and measures, the growth of MFS in poorer countries exceeds 
those of wealthier countries (World Bank, 2017). Chen (2016) refers to this as ‘last mover 
advantage’ but this is more than a simple observation; it is a normative statement that needs 
critical discussion (which we return to at the end of the section). ‘Financial access’ is 
determined by access to accounts and how people borrow, make payments, manage risks, and 
save. Account ownership can be defined as a singly or jointly owned account either through a 
financial institution or a mobile money provider (typically mobile-phone based and not 
associated with a financial institution), to store money, to send money (e.g. bill payment to 
the government or on-line shopping) or to receive money (e.g. remittances and other private 
cash transfers) (World Bank, 2017). Definitions of ‘financial inclusion’ vary, such as 
expanding the ratio of the population that has access to formal financial services (Burns, 
2018), delivering sustainable and useful financial services at affordable costs to 
disadvantaged and low‐income people (Kim et al., 2018), or even the broader condition of 
financial regulations to ensure customers’ finances are adequately protected against risk 
(World Bank, 2017). 
To examine financial access or financial inclusion, we rely mainly on the World 
Bank’s 2017 ‘Global Findex’ which attempts to measure ‘financial access’ for some 140 
countries2. We acknowledge the methodologically nationalist character of this data, which 
obscures sub-national differences and, in many cases, social or ‘intersectional’ differences in 
MFS’ adoption, but we nonetheless proceed with these caveats in mind. We supplement this 
review of the largely adulatory quantitative data with more critical, qualitative studies. 
                                                 
2 For other surveys of the use of MFS, see e.g. Alampay et al., 2017; Jack and Suri, 2016; IDRC, 2018; IMF, 
2018; Kim et al., 2018; Lenka and Barek, 2018; and Ouma et al., 2017). To avoid the problems of triangulation, 
including different survey periods, we rely principally on the World Bank 2017 Global Findex. 
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According to the World Bank (2017), financial inclusion is increasing in the global south 
based on ownership of mobile money accounts. This is especially the case in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) where account ownership grew from 11% in 2014 to 21% in 2017, although 
there are national differences within SSA: those having a mobile money account ranged from 
about 15% in the Central African Republic to 73% in Kenya. Regardless of these national 
differences, account ownership is far higher in SSA than in other ‘macro-regions’3 such as 
Latin America or North Africa (World Bank, 2017). Even in such self-described FinTech and 
blockchain ‘nodes’ as Dubai, MFS are far less developed (Zalan and Toufaily, 2017). In any 
case, of those 21% who owned a mobile account in SSA, about half already had an account 
with a financial institution, while the other half had opened a mobile-only account (World 
Bank, 2017). This points to an important distinction in the literature between ‘additive’ 
(adding a mobile account to an already existing ‘bricks and mortar’ account) and 
‘transformational’ mobile financial services (‘banking the unbanked’) (Porteous, 2006). This 
in turn raises an important question: the extent to which the uptake of MFS may be 
encapsulated by the idea of ‘digitalization’ rather than by ‘financialization’. We return to this 
question subsequently. 
Beyond these macro-regional or nationally aggregated statistics are social differences, 
with men continuing to outnumber women in the adoption of mobile accounts (a gap of 9% 
in 2017), though here too there are differences by country. Likewise, there are differences by 
income, education, and employment condition, with poorer households having 13% less 
accounts than richer households. The ‘less-educated’ and informally employed also have a 
lower adoption than the more formally educated and formally employed (World Bank, 2017).  
Studies indicate that MFS have led to higher volumes of remittances than for non-
users of mobile accounts, and the percentage of people using a mobile account to pay for 
agricultural products reached some 40% in Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia, and this in turn led to 
the increased sale of crops and greater household income (Alampay et al., 2017; World Bank, 
2017). In contrast, while MFS may have increased savings, Alampay et al. (2017) argue that 
this has not been statistically significant. Concerning the broad claim that MFS reduces 
poverty, Jack and Suri’s (2016) research on the MPESA network in Kenya shows that MFS 
brought 194,000 people (or 2% of Kenyan households) out of ‘extreme poverty’ and 
“induced 185,000 women to switch into business or retail as their main occupation” (p. 
                                                 
3 As with the problems of ‘methodological nationalism’, such ‘macro-regions’ are theoretically underspecified 
spatial metaphors, and they may or may not have any analytical value. The available data is nonetheless 
aggregated as such.  
  16 
1289), although strong reservations have been expressed concerning their methodology (see 
Bateman et al., 2019).  
Beyond SSA, Ant Financial in China handles digital payments and loans through 
Taobao, an e-commerce platform.4 Alibaba calls this its Taobao Strategy, a program to bring 
financial services to rural areas that are ‘underserved’ by Chinese banks. This combines 
digital payments with village stores (Taobao service centers) which provide a range of 
consumer goods. In essence, the program works like a ‘digital company store’, providing 
digital access and loans to villages, but it also entails selling agricultural products to cities, 
enabling new forms of rural-based entrepreneurship. Ding et al. (2018) argue that Taobao is 
bringing rural people back to villages through the creation of rural employment and slowing 
or even halting the massive internal migration that was common in the 2000s. 
In contrast to such studies of MFS and their positive implications for financial 
inclusion and poverty reduction, a handful of studies and NGO-based accounts have pointed 
to at least five related problems. First is the problem of individual indebtedness associated 
with borrowing (Bateman et al., 2019; Bernards, 2019a, 2019b; CGAP, 2018; Fick and 
Mohammed, 2018). In some cases, gambling addiction has driven borrowing and vice versa, 
and the former is widespread in many sub-Saharan countries. In the case of M-PESA, 
borrowing involves formal lending through Safaricom’s partner M-Shwara, and informal 
lending through one’s peers within the M-PESA network. A loan from anywhere between $5 
and $500 can be obtained instantly and with little scrutiny (Bateman et al., 2019). Surveys in 
Kenya and Tanzania found that roughly half of the borrowers in both countries re-paid their 
loans late, and about 12% and 31% respectively defaulted on their loans (CGAP, 2018). 
Additionally, 20% reduced their food purchases in Kenya to cover repayment of their loans, 
and 16% borrowed more money from friends and relatives for repayment of bank loans.  
A second and related problem is firm bankruptcies (or at least market exit) of small or 
micro-firms, stemming from inadequate demand for goods and services, and from the 
competitive pressures created by new micro-entrepreneurs. Consequently, argue Bateman et 
al. (2019), the net contribution of jobs is likely to be near or close to zero in especially highly 
localized markets. A third issue is the percentage of loans that are spent on individual 
consumption (including gambling) rather than productive consumption (CGAP, 2018), 
                                                 
4 There are macro-regional differences in the way in which for example electronic payments are processed in 
China and SSA. As the World Bank (2017) notes, there is a ‘Chinese model’ using third party payment services 
such as Alibaba or WeChat, and a Kenyan model in which mobile network operators offer MFS, which need not 
be linked to any financial institution.  
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calling into question the entrepreneurial and productive promise of MFS. A fourth problem is 
fraud, which seems to be growing in countries such as Ghana and South Africa (Shukla, 
2018). A fifth challenge is the constant problems of unreliable or expensive batteries for cell-
phones, the serial use of replacement phones with more learning time required, and the lack 
of time to use mobile phones, especially given domestic demands, all of which disadvantages 
women users of MFS (Wyche and Olsen, 2018). In outlining the above problems, we would 
reiterate that there are very few critical studies that examine the personal, group-based, or 
business/entrepreneurial risks associated with MFS, such as loan defaults and bankruptcies. 
However, such critical studies do suggest that the celebration of MFS as a solution to 
financial exclusion and poverty in the global south (the empowerment narrative of ‘last 
mover advantage’) is premature.  
 We argue then that critically inclined economic/development geographers can 
contribute to examining financial inclusion and poverty reduction through MFS in at least 
two related ways. Firstly, Bernards (2019b) argues that the roll-out of MFS involves a market 
segmentation - a ‘cherry-picking’ of the ‘urban less-poor’ in terms of financial initiatives. We 
are not necessarily contesting this claim and in fact, we applaud an analysis that moves 
beyond broad, methodological nationalist assertions. However, this is not only an assertion 
from the perspective of MFS providers, but both ‘urban’ and ‘less poor’ are particular socio-
spatial categories that may require even more socio-spatial sensitivity. The concept of ‘urban’ 
is hardly clear, as fifty years of urban studies have shown, and there is a need to develop 
more creative spatial metaphors that account for spatially fluid financial networks that avoid 
vague (and sometimes paradoxically rigid) metaphors such as ‘urban’ and ‘rural’. Secondly, 
the idea of the ‘less poor’ does not account for other ‘intersectionalities’ and their recursive 
relationship to MFS. By this, we do not mean thinking strictly in terms of conventional social 
differences or subjectivities such as class, ethnicity gender, and so on (after all, the salience 
of the ‘western’ concept of ‘class’, for example, is by no means uncontested across the global 
south). Rather, we have in mind how MFS creates new, or reinforces/(re-)combines existing 
social configurations that shape the spatial contours of MFS. As Kusimba (2018) notes, “The 
practices of digital finance in Kenya rest less on household budgets and bargaining power 
with husbands than on a distribution of debt and credit relations across diverse financial 
circuits including kin, friends, community and financial providers” (p. 248). Consider for 
example, the use of MFS within women-specific Accumulating or Rotating Credit and 
Savings Associations or other social networks in Kenya (Johnson, 2016; Kusimba, 2018). 
Since there is no financial product available to suit the needs of such money-pooling groups, 
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group members use a combination of other digital apps and a Safaricom Paybill number 
(otherwise designed for commercial/retail payments) to collect ‘digital donations’ for raising 
funds for anything from airline tickets to tuition, or weddings. The result is that Safaricom 
now advertises its own ‘Paybill numbers’ as a response to the use of such numbers in 
group/fiduciary-based fundraising (Kusimba, 2018). This in turn raises questions about the 
methodological individualism of some assessments of MFS and demonstrates how providers 
reinforce the social and community dynamics of finance. In short, economic/development 
geographers can develop socio-spatial analyses that do not draw only on methodological 
nationalism or individualism, and in so doing may be better equipped to understand the 
spatialized segmentation of markets for MFS from the standpoint of both the providers and 
users of MFS. This in turn might shed greater light on the consequences for financial 
inclusion and related issues of debt, bankruptcies, and poverty.  
Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of MFS growth, governments are central to 
their promotion across the global south (Burns, 2018; Ding et al., 2018; Lenka and Barik, 
2018; Shim and Shin, 2016; Zalan, 2018). Gabor and Brooks (2017) show that MFS is 
orchestrated by a combination of public, private, and philanthropic agencies in a “fast 
evolving fintech–philanthropy–development (FPD) complex” (p. 424). This involves 
networks of policy-makers, international financial organizations, FinTech companies, and 
‘philanthropic investment firms’ (see also Bateman et al., 2019; Mawdsley, 2018; Singh, 
2019; Stolz and Lai, 2020). Their ostensible mission is financial inclusion, and this might be 
viewed as part of a wider move towards ‘post-aid’ (Mawdsley, 2015) or post-micro-finance-
led growth (Bernards, 2019a) in poorer countries. Among the many organizations with the 
goal of financial inclusion in poorer countries is the Omidyar network – a philanthropic 
investment organization that invests in FinTech start-ups and partners with private firms. 
Credit scores are generated using the pattern of calls and text messages from people without 
credit history. Other companies create digital footprints by inviting potential ‘thin file’ 
customers to participate in online games and quizzes to create behavior and risk data, which 
in turn generates ‘predictive algorithms’. Such data and algorithms become central “to 
pushing the risk frontier in low-income countries” (Gabor and Brooks, 2017: 429), which 
means that institutions which encourage FinTech, embrace, whether wittingly or not, a form 
of ‘nudging’ associated with behavioral economics (see also Berndt, 2015). Thus, for Gabor 
and Brooks (2017): “Poverty is understood as a new frontier for profit-making and 
accumulation” (p. 424). This production of ‘unbanked’ financial subjects is occurring as 
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development discourses and practices have shifted from correcting market failures to 
producing particular subjects.  
Gabor and Brooks’ critical exposition raises a number of theoretical or conceptual 
questions for economic/‘development’ geographers. The first concerns the centrality of MFS 
in the broader ‘digitalization’ of the world, which refers to computational technologies (such 
as AI) and the changing experience of space and time through digital systems and digital 
discourses (Ash et al., 2018). In this vein, we argue that research needs to delve further into 
both ‘additive’ dimensions of MFS (recall Porteous, 2006) and more transformational 
accounts, to scrutinize how processes of digitalization and financialization are intertwined in 
complex ways in shaping ‘development’.  
Our second question then, is the extent to which MFS signals a new hegemonic form 
of financialization in poorer countries, and specifically a new financial governmentality 
(itself coupled with digitalization). Financialization is no doubt a contested and multifarious 
concept (Christophers, 2015; Hall, 2011; Pike and Pollard, 2010), but for our purposes, we 
modify French et al.’s (2011) more Foucauldian definition of financialization  as “the 
processes and particular effects of the growing power of financial values and technologies” 
(p. 779) on individuals, households, and groups. Are there limits to the creation of these new 
financial subjectivities? We have argued that group practices shape the contours of MFS, 
rather than simply the other way around. Perhaps more significantly, Bernards (2019a) has 
shown that the purchasing power of the global poor is limited by the informalization of labor, 
which constrains the success of FinTech’s search for market expansion, the international 
agenda of financial inclusion, and ultimately we think, the limits of a new financial 
governmentality.  
A third and related theoretical question is whether the rise of MFS represents the 
continuation of neoliberal colonialism (e.g. Manzo and Padfield, 2016; Postero, 2013) or 
whether (in the case of SSA) an indigenous and uneven ‘AfricaCapitalism’ has emerged (see 
e.g. Ouma, 2017: 504). Rather than assuming the economic power of northern-owned 
telecommunications and financial actors and asymmetrical power relations between the 
global north and south, indigenous elites and local politics also have important impacts on 
MFS landscapes. For example, in 2017, the political opposition in Kenya called for a boycott 
of Safaricom, and the company lost market share not to a northern-owned company but to 
Indian-owned Bharti-Airtel Kenya (Reuters, 2019).  
The fourth question concerns the consequences of MFS for financial inclusion and 
poverty reduction, and thus development theory more broadly. Given the available evidence 
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(and methodological problems aside), financial inclusion as defined by the World Bank has 
increased in the global south. Whether this contributes to poverty reduction (the benefits of 
‘last mover advantage’) in regions as diverse as western Tanzania or China, or whether it will 
exacerbate social/racial, international, or intra-national inequality, and ultimately calcify 
poverty in the global south, probably requires longer term studies to discern.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we identified the ways in which the academic and grey literature has examined 
FinTech. What is particularly novel about FinTech is its use of AI, digital re-intermediation, 
the proliferation of blockchains, and mobile technologies. We framed our analysis through 
the ‘FinTech Cube’, to avoid technological determinism, and to underscore how FinTech 
unfolds through the intersections of technologies, actors (including consumers), institutions, 
and financial products and services.  
We focused on two research themes in which FinTech matters for economic 
geography: global production and financial networks, and financial inclusion and poverty 
reduction in poorer countries. First, the operations of GPNs and GFNs need considerable re-
thinking in light of FinTech. Who counts as a financial actor is changing as the boundary 
becomes blurred between technology firms and financial institutions in the provision of 
financial services. Data expertise and digital infrastructures are also enabling some 
manufacturing firms to develop new financial offerings while facilitating the crossover of 
some technology firms into retail and distribution markets, with growing power to reshape 
supplier relationships and broader production networks. These firms have common 
advantages and assets in data technologies and platform organization, enabling them to 
extract value from user data and the intermediation process in order to generate new products 
and services. Over time, could we perhaps consider a shift from GPNs as a form of capitalist 
organization and accumulation towards global production platforms, in which user-generated 
data, algorithmic framings of risks and markets, and digital intermediation become not only a 
key source of revenue but also significant modes of control of production and consumption? 
Such a substantive debate is beyond the current scope of this paper, but some scholars are 
starting to engage with the concept of platforms and consider their theoretical implications 
for issues of value, rent, modes of accumulation and governance (Haberly et al., 2019; 
Sadowski, 2020; Zook and Blankenship, 2018), which will shape scholarly thinking on the 
spatial organization and uneven outcomes of economic activities. Research on the growth and 
development of IFCs also needs to consider more seriously the locational decisions of 
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FinTech firms and institutions, how they intersect with networks of knowledge and clusters 
of innovation, and the forms of capital, regulatory and organizational structures that are 
integral to the evolution of IFCs. Instead of just focusing on financial centers and offshore 
jurisdictions in GFNs, a geographical analysis of FinTech needs to incorporate the broader 
economic system supporting innovation and start-ups (Haberly et al., 2019). These would 
include policies and key infrastructure (e.g. knowledge networks, IT systems and the built 
environment) for supporting technological innovation, the development of technology-based 
labor markets (not only relating to banking and finance), and the availability of venture 
capital and private equity (Pan et al., 2016).  
 In terms of financial inclusion and poverty reduction in poorer countries, the available 
empirical evidence on MFS seems to suggest more rather than less financial inclusion, at 
least as defined and measured by such institutions as the World Bank. There is also evidence 
to suggest that this leads to poverty reduction. However, equally compelling studies (see 
especially Bateman et al, 2019) raise piercing questions about empirical omissions and 
flawed methodologies, which render the empirical evidence suspect. What might be at stake 
from these findings for future empirical research and theory in economic geography? In terms 
of the former, spatially sensitive, critical scholars might contribute to future research by 
moving beyond methodological nationalism to develop new spatialities for exploring 
financial inclusion and poverty reduction, while attending to (emergent) intersectionalities 
with respect to the consequences of MFS, including but not limited to, new forms of fraud, 
indebtedness and personal and commercial bankruptcies. Theoretically, the study of MFS in 
terms of financial inclusion and poverty reduction opens up new questions about the 
relationship between digitalization and financialization; about (the limits of) a new and 
putatively hegemonic financial governmentality; whether MFS reflect an on-going neoliberal 
colonialism or a nascent (but contested) ‘AfricaCapitalism’ in the case of sub-Saharan Africa 
specifically; and lastly, whether MFS will ultimately contribute to more (or less) financial 
inclusion and poverty reduction in poorer countries.  
While this paper has generally taken FinTech as ‘working’ on its own terms  in the 
context of global production and financial networks and development issues, FinTech does 
not always fulfil its own claims (such as delivering financial services cheaply when and 
where they are needed) and research into FinTech failures are just as important as studying 
their success and limitations. Other than the potential impacts of FinTech mediated financial 
inclusion/exclusion, recent IPO flops such as from Uber, Latitude Financial and WeWork, 
and the 2018 cryptocurrencies crash raise important theoretical questions regarding crises of 
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overaccumulation, finance and the ‘real’ economy, the limitations of algorithmic governance, 
and the operations of code/space in economy and society (Zook and Blankenship, 2018). 
While our paper has focused on financial inclusion in the global south (noting complex 
relationships with global north finance and technology firms and institutions), issues of 
inequality and indebtedness through FinTech are also important in the global north. Indeed, 
research into the digital transformation of rental housing market as a new asset class in the 
USA (Fields, 2019) and the platform lending in the UK and USA (Anderson et al., 2020; 
Clarke, 2019) demonstrate the importance of new and reconfigured geographies of FinTech-
enabled financial inclusion/exclusion that is not limited to poorer countries.  
 Likewise, FinTech is too important to be left to economic geography, and there is 
already work afoot in other areas of human geography and cognate social sciences, such as 
the growing engagement with FinTech in urban studies (especially related to the smart cities 
literature) and in labor geography (with particular concerns about the ‘gig economy’). 
Nonetheless, we hope that our focus on the economic geographies of FinTech, opens up new 
avenues for critically engaged and spatially aware research in economic geography, if not 
beyond.  
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